Abstract. With environment quality decreases, consumer's environmental awareness (CEA) increases and more and more manufacturers are willing to produce the product with low carbon emission. At the same time, government employs the carbon quota to stimulate the manufacturer to produce green product. This paper studies how CEA and carbon quota affect the carbon emission rates and prices of the products when there are two competitive manufacturers. We give the explicit expressions of the optimal carbon emission rates and prices and analyze the impact of the size of the manufacturer, the sensitivity of switchovers toward price and CEA. We find that (1) the optimal emission reduction rates increase with CEA and prices but decrease with the emission reduction cost coefficient; (2) manufacturers' profits increase with the increase of the sensitivity of switchovers toward price, CEA and the total carbon quota; (3) manufacturers' retail prices, emission reduction rates and profits are equal when the manufacturers' size are the same; When the sizes of two manufacturers are different, the larger the size of the manufacturer, the greater the profit.
Introduction
According to previous research, at least 90% of the effects of global warming are likely to be caused by human activities [1] . Nowadays, with the aggravation of the greenhouse effect, environmental protection has become a social responsibility. Consumers pay more and more attention to environmental protection. The rise of environmental awareness changes consumer behavior [2] . The BBMG Conscious Consumer Report shows that 51% of Americans are willing to pay more for products with high environmental quality and 67% agree that it is important to buy products with environmental benefits [3] . Thus manufacturers may obtain higher profits by designing the product with low carbon emissions to attract more consumers.
In order to stimulate more manufacturer to produce product with low carbon emission, the government employs many policies, such as subsidy for the green product, allocation finite carbon quota for each manufacturer, tax to the product with high pollution, and so on. Allocating finite carbon quota for each manufacturer is an significant policy to limit manufacturer's emission. And the carbon trading has been prevalent in the international market. Assume that the government allocate the total carbon, in this paper we mainly investigate the following questions:
（1）How consumer environmental awareness impacts emission reduction rate of the product and manufacturers' profits? （2）How the carbon quota policy affects the manufacturer's strategy?
Literature review
Our work is closely related to the research on green product with low carbon emission and manufacturer competition in operations management. In the following, we summarize the recent literature of the two areas.
Firstly, we introduce the literature about carbon emission and government policy. Li et al.(2014) analyzes the impact of carbon subsidy on remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain, they also explores the profits and the carbon emission quantities of three types of a supply chain: forward supply chain, remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain, and RCLSC with the carbon subsidy [4] . Yang and Xiao(2017) study how prices, green levels and expected profits are influenced by channel leadership and governmental interventions. Green level sensitivity and fuzzy degree of parameters are considered [5] . Xu and Xie (2016) deeply research into the difference of supply chain system in economic benefits, environmental protection and social benefits [6] . Zhang et al. (2017) investigate the government's optimal subsidy and tax policies in response to consumer environmental awareness (CEA) and the manufacturers' product selection (generic, green or both) plus quality and pricing decisions [7] . However, above literature did not consider the carbon quota allocation and most of the studies did not explore the manufacturers competition.
The second stream focuses on the impact of competition on supply chain enterprises. Liu et al.(2012) focus on the impact of competition and consumers' environmental awareness on key supply chain players by consider both the production competition between partially substitutable products made by different manufacturer [8] . Zhang et al. (2016) focus on the green supply chain performance in a single manufacturer-retailer setup,they found competition improves supply chain efficiency and manufacturer's profit proportion [9] . Chen et al. (2017) take price and emission sensitive demand into account and incorporate competition between the two rival manufacturers in the demand function [10] . Above studies focus on consumer awareness of environmental, competition in the supply chain, and government policy, but these studies did not take the carbon quota allocation into account.
Therefore, in this paper we will mainly study the impact of manufacturers competition, CEA and carbon quota allocation on green product design, price and manufacturers' profits.
Problem assumptions and model description
In this paper, we assume that there are two manufacturers, and the size of the manufacturer 1 is denoted by 1 M , the size of the manufacturer 2 is denoted by 2 M . The government allocate the total carbon quota, and each manufacturer's carbon quota is determined by the manufacturer's size and competitor's size. If the manufacturer have the surplus of the carbon quota, he could sell it and obtain the extra revenue; but if the carbon emission exceeds the quota, the manufacturer needs to purchase the carbon quota. Therefore, the manufacturer need to determine the environmental quality and price of each product to balance the cost and revenue. Assumption 1. The total government carbon quota (denote as 0 s ) is a constant. Assumption 2. Assume that each product have two attributes, price (denoted as p) and emission reduction rate (denoted as e ), influencing consumer demand. Product demand increases with emission reduction rate increases and decreases with price.
Similar to Zhang et al. (2015), we consider that the demand functions for products 1 and 2, denoted by 1 q and 2 q , possess the following structure:
Where a is initial market potential, θ is the sensitivity of switchovers toward price.Where τ represents consumer environmental awareness, i p is the retail price of the product, e i is the emission reduction rate. 
Model formulation and solution
In this section, we give the two manufacturers' optimal strategies--the optimal emission reduction rates and the optimal retail prices. Therefore, it mainly includes the following two subsection.
The optimal emission reduction rates
In this subsection, we first give the optimal emission reduction rate, then discuss the impact of CEA, unit price of carbon emission and cost coefficient of emission reduction of the manufacturer on the optimal emission reduction rate; finally discuss the impact of CEA and the sensitivity of switchovers toward price on the optimal profit of the two manufacturers. 
（7）
As the Theorem 1 shows, The optimal emission reduction rates of the products and the expected manufacturer's profit changes with many factors, the change is reflected in the Propositions 1-3. 
The optimal retail price
In the subsection 4.1, we have calculated the optimal emission reduction rates of * 1 e and * 2 e . In this subsection the manufacturer determines the optimal retail price based on its own optimal emission reduction rate. Theorem 2. The optimal price are as follows: 
As the Theorem 2 shows, the optimal price changes with many factors, due to the complexity of the formula (8) and (9), the change of the optimal price will be present in the proposition 5 and section 5 numerical examples.
Proposition 4.
(i) the optimal retail price of manufacturer 1 increases with the size of the manufacturer 2.
(ii) the optimal retail price of manufacturer 2 increases with the size of the manufacturer 1.
Because of the complexity of the formula (8) and (9), we will study the effect of CEA and the sensitivity of switchovers toward price on the optimal retail price in the numerical examples.
Numerical Examples
To draw more managerial insights from the theoretical results above, we present the numerical analysis in this section. In this section, we mainly study the effect of CEA, the sensitivity of switchovers toward price and the size of the manufacturer on the retail price, optimal emission reduction rate and optimal profit of the two manufacturers. We assume that initial market potential a =10,cost coefficient of emission reduction of the manufacturer is c=50,unit price of carbon emission c 0 =10,the government's total carbon quota s 0 = 40.
Example 1
In this section,we study the impact of CEA on the emission reduction rates, retailer price and profits of the two manufacturers. In table 2, we assume that the sensitivity of switchovers toward priceθ =0.5, the size of the manufacturer 1is 6,the size of the manufacturer 2 is 2.
As the Table2 shows, when the consumer environmental awareness is within a certain
, the emission reduction rate is meaningful. In this range, retailer price per unit of manufacturer ,emission reduction rate of product and the manufacturers' profit increase with τ . 128.046 Therefore, manufacturers can improve the environmental awareness of consumers in this scope to make enterprises obtain higher profits and it is more conducive to reduce carbon emissions and protect the environment.
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Example 2
In this subsection,we study the impact of the sensitivity of switchovers toward price on the emission reduction rates, retailer price per unit of manufacturer and profits of the two manufacturers. In table 3 ,we assume that the consumer environmental awareness τ =2,the size of the manufacturer 1 1 M is 6, the size of the manufacturer 2 2 M is 2. .704 As the Table3 shows, retail price,emission reduction rate of product and the expected manufacturer's profit increase withθ .The profits of the two manufacturers increase much larger with the θ .
In this case, manufacturers may increase their emission reduction rates to attract consumers asθ increases. The cost of reducing emissions increase with e, so the two manufacturers increase retail prices, then the profits of the two manufacturers increase with θ .
Example 3
In this subsection,we study the impact of the size of the manufacturer on the emission reduction rates, retail price and profits of the two manufacturers. In table 4, we assume that the τ =2,θ = 0.5. Table 4 shows,the two manufacturers' retailer price , emission reduction rates and the profits are equal when the two manufacturers are the same size. When the size of the manufacturer 1 increases gradually, but the size of the manufacturer 2 does not change, the retail price, the emission reduction rate and the profit of manufacturer 1 increase, and the manufacturer2's retail price, emission reduction rate and profit decrease accordingly.
We only study the size of the manufacturer 2 unchanged and the size of the manufacturer 1 change due to the symmetry of the two manufacturers. As the Table 4 shows, manufacturers who try to gain greater profits may expand their own business scale compared to the competitor.
Conclusions
This study examines the influence of emission reduction rate, carbon quota, consumers' environmental awareness (CEA), manufacturer competition on retail prices, emission reduction rates and manufacturers' profits.
Our study has three main managerial implications.First,our results show that retail price, emission reduction rate of product and the manufacturers' profits increase with CEA. Manufacturers could improve CEA by advertising or other ways to obtain more profits. Second, retail prices, emission reduction rates and manufacturers' profits increase with price sensitivity. Manufacturers have to improve their competitiveness to the extent possible to achieve higher profits. Third, the two manufacturers' retail prices, emission reduction rates and profits are equal when the two manufacturers are the same size. Larger manufacturers will get higher profits. Therefore, manufacturers could try to expand their own business scale compared to their competitor. ,The theorem can be obtained.
